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Abstract—This work addresses the issues related to network
steganography in IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (WPAN). The proposed communication scheme employs
illicit Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum code sequences for the
transmission of steganographic data. The presented approach is a
compromise between minimising the probability of covert channel
disclosure and providing robustness against random errors and
a high steganographic data rate. The conducted analyses show
that it is possible to create a covert channel with a data rate
comparable to the raw data rate of IEEE 802.15.4 without much
impact on the perceived receiver sensitivity, the Chip Error Rate
and the Bit Error Rate.
Index Terms—network steganography; DSSS; IEEE 802.15.4;
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularisation of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is pro-
pelled by the predicted implementation of the Internet of
Things [1] concept. The incorporation of Wireless Personal
Area Networks (WPAN) into the IP-domain and the prolif-
eration of IP-based sensor networks will trigger the same
threats as presently observed in the Internet. Among these
risks is steganography, named one of the more more significant
security issues in present day networks [2].
Steganography is a technique of conducting covert commu-
nication by means of embedding secret messages into some
form of carrier [3]. The carrier, in network steganography,
may be defined in a variety of ways the most common
being the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) of a certain protocol
but, generally, it may be any intrinsic property of a protocol
or a number of protocols [4]. It is possible to utilise the
time relations of the PDUs, their contents, losses, damages
or ordering to convey the additional information. The main
aim of steganography is to keep communication concealed
so that unaware onlookers will not notice any aberration in
comparison to standard protocol functioning.
Fig. 1 is an illustration of various steganographic techniques
which had been proposed for IEEE 802.15.4. The author of
this work proposes a classification based on the International
Organization for Standardization Open System Interconnection
Reference Model (ISO OSI RM) layer, corresponding to the
protocol, whose mechanisms are exploited for covert commu-
nication. The physical layer steganography methods proposed
for IEEE 802.15.4 represent three distinct approaches to the
Fig. 1. Overview of steganographic techniques feasible in IEEE 802.15.4
networks.
creation of covert channels. The first trend involves commu-
nication with the aid of Physical Layer (PHY) header fields.
This low throughput method, proposed in [5], stipulates the
usage of the PHY Service Data Unit (PSDU) length field in
the PHY header to hide information.
The second group of methods, discussed in [6] and [7], in-
volves the usage of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
sequences to convey the message. The main principle of this
approach is to tamper the standard provided DSSS sequences,
and to transmit information over these induced errors. The
usage of this technique provides a very capacious covert
channel, but it comes at a cost of deteriorating the efficiency
of the underlying genuine IEEE 802.15.4 communication.
Lastly, there had been suggestions [8] that it is possi-
ble to exploit the energy sensing mechanism to implement
steganographic communication between devices within each
others energy sensing range. This can be possibly exploited
by devices complying with different standards. The data set
is a special alphabet consisting of different length packets.
Here the information carrier is the energy burst duration. The
main idea behind this scheme is the method for differentiation
between regular packets and the steganographically modulated
packets. This differentiation is possible thanks to the fact that
the distribution of the length of regular packets is usually
n-polar, where n is a small integer, and thus allows for
the addition of a broad spectrum of different-length packets
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conveying additional meaning.
MAC layer allows for more versatility than the PHY in
terms of the creation possibilities of hidden communication
channels. The authors of [5] provide an overview of these
methods, majority of which utilise the reserved fields of
frames, or rely on the deliberate choice of values in otherwise
random-initialised fields. The first group of steganographic
techniques utilises the reserved fields within the MAC header
(MHR) to transmit up to 5 bits per packet with the aid of
the reserved bits within the Frame Control field. The second
group of method relies on the initialisation of otherwise
randomly initialised fields with parts of, or whole, stego-
objects. For example, this action can be performed on the
Sequence Number field of the MAC header. Both of these
methods are characterised by low steganographic bandwidth.
The rest of this work is organised as follows. Sections
II and III provide an overview of steganographic methods
for IEEE 802.15.4 and a detailed description of the DSSS
steganography concept. Section IV provides an embedding
scheme in tampered DSSS sequences. Section V demonstrates
the influence of covert channels on the performance metrics of
underlying legit communication. Finally, section VI concludes
the work.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Physical layer steganography, especially methods involv-
ing the modification of wideband transmission schemes, has
proved to be suitable for the creation of high-bandwidth
covert channels. Szczypiorski and Mazurczyk in [9] have
proposed a method for hiding data in Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiplexing (OFDM) symbols of IEEE 802.11 a/g/n
networks, which provides a steganographic capacity of 1.12
Mb/s, in a channel with a raw data rate of 54 Mb/s. This
method bases on the padding of OFDM data symbols.
DSSS codes steganography is a promising method for
covert communication in IEEE 802.15.4 networks, due to its
capability to provide high-throughput channels. By far, the
employment of this scheme permits for the creation of the
most capacious of the hidden channels available for IEEE
802.15.4. As stated by Kho in [7] and Mehta et al in [6], it
is feasible to exercise mechanisms characteristic to the IEEE
802.15.4 physical layer functioning in order to transmit hidden
messages. According to these studies it is possible to create a
steganographic channel with a bandwidth exceeding by over
6 times the raw data rate of IEEE 802.15.4 [7].
The proposed solutions are based on the fact that every
sequence consisting of four bits is mapped onto a sequence
32 chips-long, prior to its transmission. This procedure is
referred to as symbol-to-chip mapping, where a symbol is the
sequence of four bits. A chip is the most elementary unit of
transmission a modulation symbol, denoted with a 0 or a
1 and represented by a corresponding bipolar code of -1 or
+1. These 32-chip sequences are predefined and constant for
all IEEE 802.15.4 compliant networks. Since the transmission
space is limited to 16 codes, it can be enlarged with little
negative influence on network functioning. Addition of surplus
sequences provides means of communication which can be
utilised for steganographic message exchange.
Both works - [6] and [7], exploit an expanded alphabet
of the DSSS sequences used to represent data symbols. The
increase in the size of the steganographic alphabet results in
the deterioration of receiver sensitivity.
III. PRINCIPLES OF DSSS STEGANOGRAPHY IN IEEE
802.15.4
In IEEE 802.15.4, the modulation technique is 16-ary
quasi-orthogonal, which means that the aforementioned 16-
chip sequences are nearly orthogonal. The selection of these
pseudo-random noise (PN) codes was performed with the aim
of maximising the Hamming distance [10] between any two of
the sequences. Upon erred reception, correction is performed
by means of simple matching with one of the base sequences
with a minimum Hamming distance to the received sequence.
An enlargement of the code space permits a steganographic
node to communicate illicit signals, which can carry secret
data. At the same time it does not deprive ordinary nodes
of the ability to receive the original, underlying message. The
presence of steganographic exchange can lead to an increase in
the experienced Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) which, in turn,
causes an increase in the Bit Error Rate (BER). The stego-
sequences’ set may be interpreted as selectively negating some
of the base sequences chips, and thus inducing artificial errors
carrying secret data. A base sequence, with the selectively
negating stego-mask applied, may be treated as an additional
code supplemented to the base, 16-ary set of DSSS codes.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The existing DSSS steganography methods for IEEE
802.15.4 are characterised by a strong correlation between
the amount of data that can be embedded in the carrier
and the observed degradation of transmission quality metrics.
This is reflected by the relation between the IEEE 802.15.4
standard compliant set of sequences and the steganographic
code set in terms of the Hamming distance values. The
two possible DSSS steganography approaches involve, either
maximising the Hamming distances between these sets, or,
contrary, attempt to keep the stego-sequences close to their
counterparts from the base set. In both cases, it is necessary
to maximise distances between sequences originating from a
common set.
The maximisation of the value of the minimum Hamming
distance will allow for relatively errorless decoding of the
received signals in poor channel conditions. An orthogonal
approach is to intentionally provide steganographic sequences
close to the default codes, which will allow for correct
decoding, but the covert channel will be susceptible to channel
errors. The general principle is illustrated in Fig. 2. This
work provides an algorithm for the embedding of additional
content into IEEE 802.15.4 data symbols which ensures a high
steganographic data rate while maintaining good performance
characteristics. This is achieved with the knowledge of the
properties of the base DSSS code set for IEEE 802.15.4 [11].
Fig. 2. The effect of the choice of steganographic DSSS sequence set on
network performance.
These sequences are 32-chip-long, which gives a possible
space of 232 of allowed combinations. But this number is
strongly limited. The sequences were chosen with the aim of
maintaining maximum Hamming distances between the codes
to provide good resistance to random errors. Calculations show
that the minimum Hamming distance between a pair of codes,
dmin is 12, the average d¯ is 17.1 while the maximum, dmax
is 20. It would be optimal to enlarge the set of existing codes
in such a manner that the lower of these values remains un-
changed. This would grant higher resistance to random errors
and reduce the negative impact on carrier communication.
Even with the application of the aforementioned rules
governing the selection of steganographic DSSS sequences,
the set of available codes is still very large. Fig. 3 provides
a simplified example of such code selection illustrating the
discussed relationship between Hamming distances and their
influence on error resilience and the perceived BER. The first
code set, whose Hamming distance to the base sequences is
small, would camouflage efficiently the covert communication.
On the other hand, it would also prove very susceptible to
any errors naturally occurring in the medium. In such case,
a steganographic sequence would be, with high probability,
incorrectly mapped onto a symbol.
The second set, whose distance to the base sequences is
by one larger than the priors, is more resilient to random
errors. This immunity comes at a cost of providing poorer
camouflage of the steganographic information exchange. An
onlooker, observing ongoing steganographic communication,
would notice that the DSSS sequences in use do not match
any of the default codes and would therefore infer that there
is a suspicious increase in the Bit Error Rate. From the point
of view of providing covert system reliability, it seems natural
to follow the Hamming distance maximisation approach, and
this is the method of preference in this work. This choice
will have effect on the algorithm for the generation of the
steganographic sequences.
Let dmin denote the minimum Hamming distance of the
DSSS code set. Correct matching of a received sequence:
O with the sequence s from the DSSS code set is always
possible if the Hamming distance between the two: d(O, s) <
bdmin−12 c. In terms of IEEE 802.15.4, this signifies that in the
absence of channel errors, it is possible to flip the values of
up to 5 chips in any sequence without any increase in the Bit
Error Rate (BER).
The altered chips in a sequence can convey steganographic
Fig. 3. A schematic example of the effect of choice of steganographic DSSS
code selection on covert channel performance.
payload with the utilisation of their position as the information
carrier. This means that a steganographic receiver would map
a received DSSS code onto the nearest sequence from the
default set and thus obtain knowledge of the positions of the
steganographically altered chips. Assuming that each layout
of i erroneous chips may be used as a unique steganographic
sequence than the size of the covert communication alphabet
may be defined as Nsteg .
Nsteg =
b dmin−12 c∑
i=1
(
32
i
)
(1)
This code space can be narrowed down if higher resistance
of steganographic sequences to random errors is needed. For
this purpose lets assume that the number of altered chips in
every sequence is equal to bdmin−12 c. The proposed embedding
procedure permits for the insertion of any of the stegano-
graphic symbols into any si DSSS sequence belonging to
the standard-compliant set S, si ∈ S. In order to decrease
the probability of disclosure of the covert communication
through autocorrelation of the observed signal it is necessary
to employ a shared key to scramble the illicit code prior to the
transmission. The scheme for the distribution of the keys used
for scrambling between steganographic nodes is not discussed
in this work. Let e be the symbol that is to be transmitted
covertly and er its randomised version. The scrambling func-
tion is a pseudo-random permutation executed by a Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) with the steganographic key
- k used as a seed. The pseudo-random permutation is a
linear operation which can be inverted at the decoder to obtain
the steganographic symbol. The employment of key rotation
further increases security of the stego-scheme.
er = Permute(e, k) (2)
e = InversePermutation(er, k) (3)
V. PERFORMANCE OF IEEE 802.15.4 UNDER STEGO-LOAD
The degradation of the perceived receiver sensitivity and
the increase in the observed Bit Error Rate for IEEE 802.15.4
in the presence of steganographic communication is bound
with the number of chip errors induced by the embedding
process. Assuming that n
′
steg chips are altered in every 32-
chip sequence, than the size of the steganographic code
set: N
′
steg =
( 32
b dmin−12 c
)
, which equals 201376 under the
considered constraints. If every sequence would map to one
steganographic symbol, then every 32-chip sequence could
carry an average of 17.62 steganographic bits. The cost of such
an approach would be the lack of scrambling and poor error
resilience of stego-symbols. For the purpose of calculations,
lets assume that every stego-sequence carries 4 data bits, which
signifies that the steganographic data rate Rsteg is equal to the
raw data rate of IEEE 802.15.4, R = 250kb/s [11]. The rest
of the code space is used for spreading purposes, therefore it
may be considered that the probability that a certain chip of the
carrier DSSS code is altered is constant, regardless of the chip
position. Let ∆d¯ be the shift in the average Hamming distance,
d¯, triggered by the introduction of the chip alterations.
∆d¯ ≈ b
dmin−1
2 c · d¯
32
(4)
Eq. 4 reflects the reduction in relative distance between two
randomly-selected codes from the IEEE 802.15.4 template
DSSS codes’ set as seen by a non-steganographic receiver.
The observed shift in the value of BER can be estimated
with the knowledge of the average number of bit errors in
the event of incorrect sequence mapping and the shift in the
probability of code misinterpretation (a symbol is 4 bits long).
∆BER =
EX(num bit err per sym err)
num bit per sym
·∆Pm (5)
The expected number of bit errors upon sequence mismatch-
ing (one of the 15 incorrect codes is picked) depends on
the probabilities that 1 (4 sequences out of 15 match this
condition), 2 (6 matching), 3 (4 matching) or 4 (1 match-
ing) bits have been erroneous. Therefore, for IEEE 802.15.4,
EX(num bit err per sym err) equals 3215 . ∆Pm is the change
in the probability that a sequence is decoded incorrectly as a
different code from the template set. It may be estimated with
the knowledge of coding gain for minimum distance decoders.
Assuming that PB is the probability of a bit error in a system
without coding, n is the code length (32 for IEEE 802.15.4),
t = bdmin−12 c is the maximum error correcting capability, then
the probability that a bit is erroneous in the presence of coding
may be defined as PC .
PC ≈ 1
n
n∑
i=t+1
i ·
(
n
i
)
· P iB(1− PB)n−i (6)
Fig. 4. BER experienced by a receiving node as seen by a non-steganographic
receiver for different embedding rates.
From 6, where PCsteg is the coding gain in the presence
of ongoing covert communication, it is possible to calculate
∆Pm.
∆Pm =
PCsteg
PC
(7)
The standard-defined BER for IEEE 802.15.4 is presented in
Eq. 8.
BER =
8
15
· 1
16
16∑
k=2
−1k
(
16
k
)
e(20·SNR·(
1
k−1)) (8)
Fig. 4 illustrates the influence of steganographic communi-
cation on the error performance of IEEE 802.15.4-compliant
device. The embedding rate Rsteg/R corresponds to the
number of data symbols that are chosen from the data stream
for embedding purposes. The steganographic modification
of one data symbol (one DSSS sequence) yields 4 bits of
steganographic capacity, therefore, for Rsteg/R = 1 the covert
channel bandwidth is 250 kb/s.
It is notable that the impact of the stego-system is most
visible in good noise conditions. Assuming that the typical
BER values for wireless networks fall in the range of 10−1
up to 10−6 [12], it may be deemed that the proposed stego-
system functions below the noise floors for IEEE 802.15.4.
The deterioration of receiver performance is estimated basing
on the characteristics of pure IEEE 802.15.4 communication.
The increase in BER for a specific steganographic data rate
can be projected onto a shift in SINR value in a pure system,
corresponding to the same jump in BER values. The change of
SINR can be interpreted as deterioration of receiver sensitivity
(this is how a network device will interpret the change in
characteristics).
For the 2450 MHz PHY, a device must be capable of
achieving a sensitivity of -85 dBm or better [11]. Assuming
that a receiver has a sensitivity of -100 dBm, the maximum
change in sensitivity cannot exceed 15 dB. This phenomenon
of apparent sensitivity decline in the presence of ongoing
covert communication is illustrated in Fig. 5.
The obtained results reveal that the proposed approach is
more efficient than the one proposed in [7]. For SNR = 4dB
Fig. 5. The change in receiver sensitivity under the presence of different
steganographic data rates and under different noise conditions.
and the embedding rate of 5 chips per symbol, the pro-
posed scheme reduces the sensitivity of a receiver by 1.8dB,
compared to over 8dB in [7]. At the same time the covert
bandwidth of the channel from [7] is 312.5kb/s, compared to
250kb/s provided in the proposed solution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The proposed DSSS steganographic coding scheme for
IEEE 802.15.4 provides a method for the coding of stegano-
graphic data this is achieved by means of introducing
additional chip errors into the template DSSS codes. This
algorithm is complimented by additional scrambling of stego-
chips, which increases the resistance of the stego-system to
detection by randomising the induced chip errors. The analysis
of the effect of usage of such tampered codes on the decoding
process revealed that it is possible to establish a 250 kb/s
covert channel on top of the carrier communication with
negligible impact on the Bit Error Rate, and a decrease in
receiver sensitivity noticeable only in poor noise conditions
(SNR exceeding 2 dB). The steganographic tampering of
default DSSS code’s chips is significantly mitigated by the
correction capabilities of the receivers.
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